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Comment Douglas W. Elmendorf
This chapter by Jim Poterba, Josh Rauh, Steve Venti, and David Wise con-
siders an important practical issue that would be associated with the intro-
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Douglas W. Elmendorf is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.duction of personal retirement accounts. Deciding that people should ac-
cumulate assets and use those assets to ﬁnance their retirements is just the
starting point. Among the myriad further decisions is choosing which as-
sets to hold—and that choice might ultimately matter a great deal. This
chapter extends earlier work by these authors and others to investigate the
implications of alternative portfolio allocations.
I enjoyed reading about this research and learned a lot from it. Detailed
simulations of the sort undertaken here are crucial in evaluating the impact
of alternative proposals for Social Security reform. The authors provide a
clear description of the various choices they needed to make for these com-
plex simulations, and those choices seem sensible to me. The authors also
do an admirable job of testing the robustness of their ﬁndings to alterna-
tive assumptions, especially when one recognizes the thousands of itera-
tions of multiperiod lifetimes that underlie each ﬁgure in the tables. Thus,
I do not have much to say about the speciﬁcs of the calculations. Instead, I
will use my limited time to discuss the interpretation of the results, making
four points in declining order of importance.
The Equity Premium
The “equity premium puzzle” plays a critical role in interpreting the re-
sults in this chapter, as it does in so many analyses regarding equity invest-
ment of retirement funds. This point is not a surprise to the authors or to
other participants in this conference. However, given its overriding impor-
tance here and in other research, tracing its eﬀects through the chapter is
worthwhile.
In tables 8.5 and 8.6, the authors present the mean and various per-
centiles of the distribution of retirement wealth under diﬀerent portfolio
choices and diﬀerent assumptions about investment conditions. One prob-
lem in thinking about these tables is simply the number of numbers shown.
Although the robustness checks are very important, it may be diﬃcult to
see the forest for the trees. Therefore, I use a diagram to summarize the in-
formation in the tables. Figure 8C.1 is a version of the familiar mean-
variance diagram, with the vertical axis showing mean retirement wealth
and the horizontal axis showing the diﬀerence in retirement wealth be-
tween the 90th and 10th percentiles (because the authors do not report
standard deviations).
The solid diamonds plot the outcomes of alternative investment strate-
gies for people with a high school education facing baseline expenses and
empirical stock returns. Naturally, the line slopes upward, with the all-
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the all-stock strategy on the far right.1 The hollow squares plot the out-
comes of alternative investment strategies for this same group facing base-
line expenses but reduced stock returns. For any investment strategy that
includes stocks, lower stock returns trim both the mean and range of re-
tirement wealth.
I constructed similar diagrams to examine retirement wealth for people
facing higher expenses and for the college-educated sample. The results
were straightforward. Compared with the baseline shown with the solid di-
amonds, higher expenses reduce the mean and range of retirement wealth
for all investment strategies. However, they have smaller eﬀects than re-
duced stock returns for investment strategies that include stocks because
annual returns are reduced by 60 to 80 basis points rather than 300 basis
points. College-educated individuals accumulate more wealth than high
school-educated individuals because they save more, but the picture is
qualitatively very similar.
These calculations simply trace out the eﬃcient frontier (after allowing
for expenses). Tables 8.8 and 8.9 turn to the utility consequences. Once
again, I have consolidated the large amount of information in the tables.
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1. One strategy seems to be dominated in the sense of being oﬀ the eﬃcient frontier—hold-
ing long-term bonds. That result is not surprising given the model of asset returns used in the
chapter, as I discuss later.
Fig. 8C.1 Retirement wealth with alternative investment strategiesFigure 8C.2 shows the dispersion of certainty equivalent wealth across al-
ternative strategies and investment conditions. The ﬁrst vertical column
shows the range of wealth outcomes for the baseline case, the second col-
umn shows the same for reduced stock returns, the third for higher risk
aversion, and the fourth for the combination of reduced returns and higher
risk aversion.
The sizes of the ranges are strikingly diﬀerent for diﬀerent assumptions.
At the far left, the best portfolio choice produces almost 2.5 times the cer-
tainty equivalent wealth of the worst portfolio choice; in the other three
columns, the best choice is only about 1.5 times as good as the worst choice.
That is, under the baseline assumptions, one’s portfolio choice matters a
lot, but under other assumptions, it matters much less.
Why? One more type of picture is helpful. The solid diamonds in ﬁgure
8C.3 plot, for the baseline case, certainly equivalent wealth against the av-
erage share of the portfolio in stocks during a lifetime. I had to guess some
of the stock shares based on information in the chapter, and I skipped the
No Lose plan because I did not know how to make an educated guess. With
that caveat in mind, the ﬁgure shows that portfolios invested more heavily
in stocks appear to have a higher risk-adjusted return.
This result should not surprise us: it is just the equity premium puzzle.
We know that if one applies a fairly low degree of risk aversion to histori-
cal equity returns, it appears that people should hold more stock than they
do. Indeed, the authors ﬁnd that the optimal ﬁxed portfolio share is 100
percent in this case. However, unless one decides that the resolution of the
equity premium puzzle is that people have just been wrong about their in-
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 295
Fig. 8C.2 Retirement wealth with alternative strategies and investment conditions296 James M. Poterba, Joshua Rauh, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise
Fig. 8C.3 Stockholding and utility
vestment choices over the past century, I do not know what one can take
from this ﬁnding.
The hollow squares represent the corresponding points assuming re-
duced equity returns. This bit of revisionist history diminishes the equity
premium puzzle—and it also eliminates the upward-sloping relationship
of the solid diamonds, suggesting that one’s portfolio choice does not mat-
ter much. This result also should not surprise us: if we have done the cer-
tainty equivalence calculation correctly, risk should play no systematic role
in the outcomes. Indeed, because risk is the main diﬀerence across these
strategies, there is now very little diﬀerence of any sort. The corresponding
ﬁgure assuming higher risk aversion rather than lower stock returns looks
quite similar.
In sum, we know that economists cannot rationalize the observed dis-
tribution of asset returns using a standard utility function with values of
risk aversion that seem plausible. Therefore, using such a utility function
to compare wealth outcomes generated with the observed distribution of
asset returns is problematic at best. Put diﬀerently, making utility compar-
isons for diﬀerent investment strategies using a utility function and a dis-
tribution of historical asset returns that are not consistent with each other
will produce results whose interpretation is very unclear.
Time Varying Equity Shares
One motivation for the chapter is the traditional piece of ﬁnancial advice
that investors should reduce their equity exposure as they get older. The
simulation results are consistent with this advice, but that appears to be amatter of happenstance rather than a reﬂection of the fundamental eco-
nomics underlying the simulations. Let me explain.
The authors note that simple economic models do not justify this tradi-
tional advice, but that more complicated models do. These complications
generally oﬀer ways to rebalance portfolios in the event of ﬁnancial shocks
or ways to adjust labor supply and labor income to compensate for ﬁnan-
cial shocks. However, the simulations in this chapter include neither of
these features and thus appear to provide no rationale for a downward pro-
ﬁle of stock holding over a lifetime.
Why, then, do the so-called optimal linear life-cycle asset allocations re-
ported in table 8.7 involve such a downward tilt? One clue is the authors’
statement that the optimal strategy “is in many cases the one with the ﬂat-
test proﬁle.” Yet the analysis does not allow for completely ﬂat or upward-
sloping proﬁles, so the results reveal only the optimal downward-sloping
linear strategy. Whether a ﬂat or upward-sloping proﬁle would generate
higher certainty equivalent wealth is not apparent.
However, the full story is more complicated, because the authors also re-
port some cases where the optimal stock holding proﬁle is not the ﬂattest
available proﬁle. These results seem to arise because all of the portfolios are
constrained to averagea 50 percent equity share over the life cycle. Because
the total size of a portfolio increases with age, less wealth is subjected to the
equity return with a downward tilt in the equity share than with a ﬂat eq-
uity share at the same average level. The results in question do not reveal a
preference for a downward slope per se but rather a preference for a smaller
eﬀective equity share on average over a lifetime. In the conditions under
which investors would prefer a larger share of equities—like the baseline
case—the preferred slope of equity holding is ﬂat because that maximizes
the amount of wealth receiving the equity return. In the conditions under
which investors would prefer a smaller share of equities—like reduced eq-
uity returns—the preferred slope is a steep one.
In sum, the simulation results pointing to a downward tilt in stock hold-
ing reﬂect limitations on the portfolio allocations considered rather than
underlying economic factors. Incorporating the factors that would gener-
ate a preferred downward proﬁle would represent a very interesting—but
very complex—extension to this chapter.
Time Variation in Asset Returns
The model used in the chapter does not allow for time variation in the
distribution of asset returns. This restriction is quite understandable in
terms of computational feasibility, but it matters for some of the results.
We know that portfolios should not be eﬃcient simply in a static, mean-
variance sense, but should hedge against future changes in investment op-
portunities. Of course, such dynamic hedging arises only because of time
variation in expected returns or volatilities. Because this chapter assumes
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over time, dynamic hedging is not a consideration in the simulations or in
the optimal portfolio allocations derived from those simulations.
One eﬀect of the lack of dynamic hedging is a missing motivation for
holding long-term bonds. In the real world, long-term bonds can provide
an intertemporal hedge against variation in short-term interest rates be-
cause their prices rise when (expected) short-term rates fall. This role for
long-term bonds does not appear in the sort of diagram I drew earlier and
does not appear in the model and simulations in this chapter. Those simu-
lations seem to imply that people should never hold long-term bonds—but
that conclusion would be inappropriate, and the authors carefully do not
draw it. More broadly, the optimal portfolio shares of stocks and TIPS can
look quite diﬀerent in models that incorporate time varying returns and
dynamic hedging than in models like the one in this chapter.
Mutual Fund Expenses
The authors show a signiﬁcant eﬀect on retirement wealth of the level of
expenses, as we would expect. This eﬀect would be even larger if the simu-
lations showed investments cumulating for longer—for example, if the
analysis included the draw-down period of retirement accounts.
The chapter also raises the concern that so-called life-cycle funds may
have higher expenses. However, I see little reason to believe that a life-cycle
feature substantially increases the true costs of running a mutual fund,
which suggests that competition is likely to whittle away at the expenses
charged. Even today, the expense ratios at Vanguard for their total stock
index fund, long-term Treasury bond index fund, and “target retirement”
funds are 0.19 percent, 0.26 percent, and 0.21 percent, respectively. Thus,
Vanguard is charging essentially nothing for the life-cycle approach. For
analysis of the sort done in this chapter, I would look beyond the current,
higher expenses of such funds and focus on the possible desirability of au-
tomatic portfolio reallocation over time.
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